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CAUGHT IN A POLITICAL THICKET: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE
Frank J. Sorauf*
It was hardly a case to warrant front page coverage. It broke
no new constitutional ground, and indeed it followed precedent almost slavishly. Nor did it affect practical politics in any way, for
the statutory provision the Court struck down-one limiting the independent expenditures of PACs and others in publicly funded
presidential elections-had never been enforced. But there it was,
Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (FEC v. NCPAC),I not only in the front pages of
our newspapers, but honored as well by a fleeting minute on the
television news.
Some of this attention certainly resulted from misunderstanding. A number of reporters confused the limits on independent
spending with the limits on PAC contributions to candidates and
proclaimed an opening of the ftoodgates.2 A good part of the attention, however, began in hope. For those concerned about the consequences of sharply rising levels of campaign spending, there was
hope that somehow, somewhere, a restraint on that rise might be
found. Among the critics of Buckley v. Valeo there was the related
hope that the Supreme Court might, in view of all that had happened in American campaign finance, reconsider its narrowing of
Congress's power to regulate campaign spending. All of those
hopes, moreover, had been raised by a broad hint from the Court
that it might be prepared to modify the Buckley precedent. But the
hint and the hopes proved illusory, only one of the mysteries of the
last ten years in the constitutional law of campaign finance.
So passed the latest episode in the Supreme Court's ill-starred
effort to reconcile the first amendment with the widely-felt need to
• Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. I am greatly indebted to
my research assistants, David Linder and David Sousa, for their help in preparing this article.
I. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
2. So great was the confusion that the FEC was forced to rush assurances to journalists that contribution limits remained intact. Common Cause also issued a "press advisory"
to try to clarify the Court's ruling.
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regulate campaign finance. In its own felicitous phrase the Court
found itself trapped in a political thicket-but not the thicket of
American politics per se so much as the barbed forest of its own
misconceptions about American politics. Most distressing of all, in
FEC v. NCPAC the Court gave no indication that it realized either
the trap or its cause.3
I.

THE NEW ERA IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Congress inaugurated the modem era of campaign finance in
the 1970's. Largely in response to the greater spending and the
larger media role in elections, it passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in 1971. This act is now remembered chiefly for
its futile attempt to roll back the new tide of media-based politics.
Those reform efforts, however, were soon overtaken by the events of
Watergate and all of its related tales of perjury, abuse of executive
power, political "dirty tricks," and the "laundering" of illegal political contributions. The Watergate trauma led to substantial amendments to the FECA in 1974, which completely recast the original
work; both literally and contextually the FECA was more a product
of 1974 than of 1971.
It was that amalgam of pre- and post-Watergate legislation
that the Supreme Court had before it for argument in late 1975.
The legislation was enormously diverse and complex, for it was an
ambitious attempt to restructure campaign finance. Concerning
presidential campaigns, it established:
-a program of public financing for the post-convention campaign; if a candidate
chose to accept funding from the U.S. Treasury, he also had to agree to raise and
spend no additional monies.
-subsidies for the parties and their quadrennial nominating conventions.
-a program of financing would-be Presidents in their attempts to get their parties'
nominations, with requirements for raising individual contributions to get matching public funds.

In congressional campaigns, there was to be no public funding, but
instead an extensive system of regulated private funding, with provisions for:
-limits on sums that parties, political committees (PACs), and individuals could
contribute to candidates.
-limits on 'the sums that could be spent "independently" on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate. Such ''independent" spending had to be without the help or
connivance of the candidate aided.
-limits on the total sums that candidates for Congress could spend in the primary
and/or general election.
3.
328

u.s.

The phrase ''political thicket" is Justice Felix Frankfurter's. Colgrove v. Green,
549, 556 (1946).
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-limits on the amounts that candidates could spend from their own personal fortunes or those of their immediate families.
--extensive reporting of their receipts and expenditures by candidates, parties, and
PACs.

Concurrently, Congress created the Federal Election Commission
(FEC), the first agency it had ever created for the specific task of
receiving reports of campaign spending, verifying them, and making
them and their aggregates available to the American public.
Within little more than a year after passage of the 1974 amendments, a substantial challenge to virtually every section of the
FECA and its amendments was argued before the Supreme Court.
The challenge was no accident, for Congress had provided amply
for it in the 1974 amendments. It authorized challenges by virtually
anyone ("any individual eligible vote in any election for the office of
President"), for certification of constitutional questions to the appropriate court of appeals, and for subsequent appeal directly to the
Supreme Court ("no later than 20 days after the decision of the
court of appeals"). Congress declared that it was to be "the duty of
the court of appeals and of the Supreme Court ... to advance on
the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter certified .... "4 Expedition was accomplished
when the Court announced its decision in Buckley v. Valeo,s on January 30, 1976. The statute, of course, had never been in effect for
either a congressional or a presidential election.
The plaintiffs in Buckley-four individuals and eight groupsif not the proverbial strange bedfellows, were at least unexpected
allies. James Buckley, the Conservative senator from New York,
joined Eugene McCarthy, pied piper of the anti-war movement, and
the New York Civil Liberties Union made alliance with the American Conservative Union. In what must surely be one of the longest
per curiam decisions in its history, the Court upheld all of the provisions for voluntary public funding of presidential campaigns, both
before and after the conventions, as well as the spending limits that
are attached to such aid. It also upheld the subsidies to the parties.
But on the issues surrounding the regulation of congressional finance, the Court-to the amazement of many observers-upheld
the limits on contributions to candidates but struck down all limits
on spending: spending by candidates from their own funds or from
funds given to them, and independent spending for or against a candidate by any individual or group. It also upheld the reporting
4. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443.
§ 315(a), (b), (c), 88 Stat. 1263, 1285-86 (1974).
5. 424 U.S. I (1976).
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requirements.6
Central to the Court's holdings was the premise that campaign
spending determines the quantity of political speech and is therefore
protected by the first amendment:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the
size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.7

The Court decided that expenditure limits are "substantial rather
than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of
political speech."s A limit on contributions to candidates or committees, on the other hand,
entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free
communication. A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the
support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. 9

Finally, associational freedoms were also at stake. "Making a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person
with a candidate. In addition, it enables like-minded persons to
pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals."w
The Court defined the legitimate interests served by the legislation narrowly, even grudgingly. It accepted the appellees' suggestion of a governmental interest in "the prevention of corruption and
the appearance of corruption." 11 But it explicitly rejected their assertion of a governmental interest "in equalizing the relative ability
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections."t2
Indeed, noted the Court, "the concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."t3 Only Justice White would have upheld the limits on
expenditures.
And so, unwittingly, the Supreme Court became one of the
prime architects of the "new era" in American campaign finance.
6. This is not an exhaustive list of all the issues in Buckley. For instance, the Court
dealt at some length with the constitutionality of the FEC itself.
7. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 19 (1976).
8. /d. at 19.
9. /d. at 20-21.
10. /d. at 22.
II. /d. at 25-27.
12. /d. at 48.
13. /d. at 48-49.
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Congress ended the domination of the large contributor as it began
the new reign of the small contributor and the political action committee.I4 It also instituted the first system of full and open disclosure of the transactions of campaign finance, and with it, greatly
expanded media attention to money in politics. For its part the
Court, by striking down limits on contributions, cleared the way for
a striking increase in the sums of money spent on elections.
Although public funding of presidential elections continued, it has
not been extended to congressional campaigns, and the movement
for public funding in the states has lost momentum. Is Indeed, the
American Presidency remains the only office in the country for
which the candidates may choose full public funding of the
campaign.
The cost of congressional campaigning rose from $99 million
in 1976 to $374,000,000 in 1984. Discounting for inflation, the increase was 109 percent.'6 While there were 1,146 PACs in 1976,
there were 4,009 by the end of 1984. Independent expenditures in
the presidential and congressional elections of 1976 were approximately $2,000,000; by 1984 they had ballooned to $23,400,000.
Every scrap of data we have suggests that similar, if less dramatic,
trends developed in the campaigns for state and local offices. Buckley's logic struck down statutes attempting to set limits on campaign spending in about two-thirds of the states. Harder to
measure, public cynicism grew apace. Unlimited spending combined with unlimited reporting-sometimes sensational and poorly
informed as well-fed every populist fear and suspicion.
II.

FEC v. NCPAC: DOUBTS AND THEN CERTAINTY

The statutory fragment at issue in FEC v. NCPAC had a brief
but tantalizing history. It had been part of the original statute creating public funding for presidential campaigns. This act provided
that no political committee (i.e., PAC) could make independent expenditures in excess of $1,000 in support of a presidential candidate
who had accepted public financing.l7 In all of the litigation at the
time of the initial challenge in Buckley, the Court had failed to rule
on its constitutionality. The Justices had, though, ruled that the
14. Contrary to the impression one gets from the media, individual contributors (other
than the candidate and his or her immediate family) still account for well over half of the
campaign receipts of congressional candidates.
15. At one time in the last decade as many as 15 states had a limited program of public
funding for campaigns for some state offices; the total in mid-1985 was 12.
16. All of my campaign finance data (unless otherwise noted) come from the official
reports of the Federal Election Commission.
17. 26 u.s.c. § 9012(f) (1982).
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statutory limits on independent expenditures in congressional elections were unconstitutional, and most observers assumed that the
logic of that holding would apply to Section 9012(f) of the Internal
Revenue Code. But not the FEC.
Operating at least publicly on the assumption of the clause's
constitutionality, the FEC sought to enforce it in the 1980 presidential election. (The newly formed FEC had been either too surprised
or too unprepared to deal with independent spending in the 1976
presidential election.) In 1980, along with Common Cause, it
forced the issue; it lost its test in the District Court for the District
of Columbia, which ruled that the clause was manifestly unconstitutional under the logic of Buckley. The Supreme Court heard the
appeal and, to the enormous surprise of the "campaign finance
bar," deadlocked on it, four-to-four in Common Cause v. Schmitt. Is
In just two sentences the Court announced the vote (but not the
line-up), the nonparticipation of Justice O'Connor, and the consequent affirmation of the decision below that held the section
unconstitutional.
The outcome in Schmitt was clear, but its significance was not.
Were four Justices signalling a desire to pull back from Buckley?
Had all of the changes in American campaign finance since early
1976 altered their constitutional calculus? Or were the four simply
convinced that this limit on independent expenditures was somehow different from the one the Court struck down in Buckley? The
answer to those questions will probably never be known, for when
the FEC persisted and brought the issue back to the Court in 1984
in FEC v. NCPAC, the Court held 9012(f) unconstitutional. And
only one new recruit, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined Justice Byron White, the single Justice in Buckley who would have upheld
limits on independent spending.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority was little more
than a reaffirmation of Buckley and several subsequent elaborations
upon it. "Reaffirmation" may not be quite the right word, however,
for the Rehnquist rhetoric was in fact a shoring up, even a hardening of the Buckley position.
III.

THE ONLY DEFENSIBLE INTEREST:
PREVENTING CORRUPTION

The heart of the jurisprudence deriving from Buckley is in the
definition of the legitimate interests a legislature may pursue in regulating the constitutionally protected flow of campaign money. Af18.

455

u.s.

129 (1982).
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ter some uncertainty, the Court made its position clear in FEC v.
NCPAC: "We held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against
Rent Control that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are [sic] the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances."I9 The
phrase--corruption and the appearance of corruption-has a ring
that most Americans will like. But its apparent clarity is deceptive,
and its origin is at best clouded. Worst of all, it is irrelevant to the
issues of contemporary campaign finance.
The Court seems to have in mind one kind of corruption: the
"buying" of subsequent legislative votes with campaign contributions. The Justices talk repeatedly about quid pro quos,2o and more
recently the phrase "exchange of political favors" has appeared.2I
Indeed, that understanding became the chief justification for striking down the limits on independent expenditures in FECA. "The
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with
a candidate or his agent," said the Buckley opinion, "not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo
for improper commitments from the candidate."22 This logic naturally led to the later decision to strike down the regulation of contributions in local referendum campaigns. No legislators or other
policy makers are being elected; hence no one can be corrupted.23
But while the quid pro quo is the nub of the matter, it is perhaps not the totality of it. Even in Buckley bits of hedging language
crept into the Court's opinion. "But laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific
attempts of those with money to influence governmental action."24
In dealing with the disclosure sections of the FECA, moreover, the
Court referred to Congress's effort "to achieve through publicity the
maximum deterrence to corruption and undue influence possible. "2s
What is the correctable evil? Is it only corruption or may it also be
mere influence, or some intermediate sin of "undue influence"?
And when is the arranging of a quid pro quo not bribery?
In FEC v. NCPAC, however, Justice Rehnquist ended the
shilly-shallying: "Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obliga19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. 1459, 1469 (1985).
E.g.• Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27, and NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1469.
FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1469.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 47.
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 27-28.
/d. at 76.
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tions of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or
infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors. "26
Clarity was reasserted, but the price was irrelevance. There may be
instances of legislators or would-be legislators accepting campaign
contributions in return for promised votes on bills or promised pressure on public agencies-but no one thinks that such transactions
are in any sense common, at least in the Congress. The real issue,
rarely articulated very precisely, is one of excessive influence. The
concern behind campaign finance legislation is not about corruption; it is about the danger that major contributors to successful
candidates will receive in return some excessive measure of influence in the making of public policy. That influence may be in the
form of "access"--open doors and sympathetic ears--or it may be
in some extra weight of information or consideration on the scales
of decision in policymaking. Indeed it may merely arise from the
election of officials already sympathetic to the campaign contributor's values or ideology.
To be sure, defining the issue as influence doesn't remove all of
the ambiguities. In the apt words of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, influence "is a term with amoebic contours."27 Nor does it
help to add adjectives such as excessive, improper, or undue.2s One
of the legitimate purposes of political activity, after all, is to achieve
political influence. In terms of campaign politics-whether money,
labor, or knowledge is volunteered-influence is best and most easily achieved by electing like-minded politicians to public office.
Similarly, political activity after the election-lobbying or citizen
contact, for example-also aims at influence. And the purpose of
the activity generally is to influence how public officials act, perhaps
even to make sure that they will act in ways that they might not
otherwise have chosen. Political persuasion, in other words, has a
political purpose; it is not an end in itself, a mere art form or civic
ceremony.
If influence is the object of democratic politics, its uneven distribution is an unexceptional fact. Some candidates win elections
and others lose; some groups persuade and some do not. The issue,
rather, is the very uneven distribution of a political resource:
money. The demand is not that all runners win the race or even
26. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1469.
27. New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, 82 N.J. 57, 76,411 A.2d 168, 177 (1980).
28. "Undue influence" is a familiar term in other bodies of law, especially the law of
wills. The distinctions employed there (which seem to hinge on free will) are of no help in
legislative politics.
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enter it, but that all runners begin from the same starting line. At
bottom, therefore, the central issue in the politics of regulating campaign finance is the mobilization of maldistributed political
resources.
IV.

THE EXCLUSION OF ALTERNATIVE INTERESTS

Early in its lengthy disquisitions in Buckley the Court noted
that the appellees had offered three governmental interests to justify
the restrictions of the FECA on contributions. The first, of course,
was the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption.
Beyond that, the appellees advanced two "ancillary" interests. The
Court summed them up this way:
First, the limits serve to mute the voices of affluent persons and groups in the election process and thereby to equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the
outcome of elections. Second, it is argued, the ceilings may to some extent act as a
brake on the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns and thereby serve to open the
political system more widely to candidates without access to sources of large
amounts of money.29

Since the invocation of the "corruption" interest sufficed to sustain
limits on contributions, the Court did not appraise the ancillary interests in this context. It was forced to do so, though, in the process
of striking down the limits on expenditures. In dealing with the
alleged interest in "equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections," the Court's prose was
absolute and magisterial:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment, which was designed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' "30

And so ended the Court's consideration of governmental interests
beyond those in its single, favored formulation.
One wonders why the Justices found it necessary to specify the
legitimate governmental interests. The Court's custom has long
been to leave the legitimate legislative interests open and unspecified, especially in early cases articulating a newly defined first
amendment right. The first and classic statement of the "clear and
present danger" doctrine, for example, did not undertake to describe all "the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre29. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25-26.
30. /d. at 48-49. The Court was quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
266, 269 (1964), which in tum was quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20
(1945) and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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vent."31 The Court's usual approach, in other words, has been a
case-by-case resolution. To the best of my knowledge, one finds an
exclusive definition of legitimate interests only in the area of campaign finance.
Of all the potentially legitimate interests spumed or ignored by
the Supreme Court, in Buckley and thereafter, none is more appealing than the legislative interest in preserving the integrity of the
electoral process. It has an estimable history in constitutional jurisprudence, and it relates easily to regulating political money. It
shifts judicial attention from the nexus between campaign finance
and governmental decision to that between campaign finance and
the outcome of the election, from whether money "buys" influence
in legislative and executive offices to whether it determines who sits
in those offices in the first place.
The Court's very first decision on campaign finance legislation,
Burroughs v. United States,32 dealt with Congress's requirement in
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 that certain political
committees in presidential campaigns report publicly the names and
addresses of their contributors and the sums of their contributions.
The Court upheld the requirement, and Justice Sutherland's opinion for the majority is peppered with references to Congress's interest in protecting the integrity of the presidential election.
To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to
deny the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection. 33
Congress reached the conclusion that public disclosure of political contributions, together with the names of contributors and other details, would tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections. 34

Moreover, Sutherland quoted extensively from Ex parte Yarbrough,3s a case upholding the legislation implementing the fifteenth amendment. For example:
That a government whose essential character is republican, whose executive
head and legislative body are both elective, whose most numerous and powerful
branch of the legislature is elected by the people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of
fraud, is a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and demand the gravest
consideration.

u.s.

31. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Cf United States v. O'Brien, 391
367, 376-77 (1968).
32. 290 u.s. 534 (1934).
33. Id. at 545.
34. ld. at 548.
35. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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If it has not this power it is left helpless before the two great natural and historical enemies of all republics, open violence and insidious corruption. 36

Burroughs is, in short, a tantalizing bit of judicial history. The
Court clearly had elections on its mind, and it spoke in terms of the
legitimate interest of Congress in assuring their integrity. It spoke
of "the corrupt use of money to affect elections," not simply of the
corruption that results from money in elections. The emphasis was
on affecting, even corrupting, the election itself. Of course, the
Court spoke at a time (1934) when the buying of votes, the casting
of votes from the graveyard, and the rigging of electoral counts
were embarrassingly frequent in American politics.37 It is both the
clear meaning of those words "to affect elections" and the history of
American electoral corruption that the Supreme Court ignored
when it quoted Burroughs in its Buckley decision.
In the more than forty years between Burroughs and Buckley
the Court began increasingly to refer to the legislative interest in
protecting the "integrity of the electoral process." The phrase appears-in one variant or another-as early as 1957, more or less in
passing. In upholding the statute that prohibited corporations and
unions from contributing directly to candidates in federal elections,
the Court noted that "what is involved here is the integrity of our
electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual
citizen for the successful functioning of that process. This case thus
raises issues not less than basic to a democratic society."Js Then,
quite strikingly, in the five years before Buckley the Court referred
in at least seven cases to the legitimate interest of the states in protecting the integrity of elections. The Justices did not always deem
this interest controlling, but they invariably conceded its importance. As the Court noted in a 1973 case upholding New York's
requirement that voters register with the party of their choice thirty
days before the primary: "It is clear that preservation of the integrity of the electoral process is a legitimate and valid state goal."39
In a case dealing with the constitutionality of filing fees for wouldbe candidates, the opinion was even more expansive: "a State has
an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political
processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies. "40
36. Id. at 657-58.
37. See, e.g., E. SIKES, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT-PRACTICES LEGISLATION
(1928). This variety of electoral corruption also gave rise to a common body of state and
local legislation on vote buying, on "treating" voters, on closing taverns on election day, and
on campaigning near a voting place.
38. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957).
39. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973).
40. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972). The other five cases were: Hill v.
Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); American Party of
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Not surprisingly, therefore, the court of appeals relied heavily
on that interest in upholding all of the FECA in Buckley. In upholding the disclosure sections, for instance, the judges noted that
the major disclosure provisions of the act "exact disclosure only
when plainly and closely related to a substantial governmental interest long recognized by the courts: protection of the integrity of
federal elections. "41 The majority opinion of the Supreme Court in
Buckley, however, mentioned this interest only once, and then very
much in passing.42 Perhaps it was merely a surviving fragment in
the cobbling together of the Court's long per curiam opinion. Indeed, in Buckley the Court seems to have begun a quiet muting and
narrowing of its commitment to the "integrity of electoral
processes." The key to its disappearance-at least in the campaign
finance cases-may well be in the 1982 case, FEC v. National Right
to Work Committee,43 which involved the reporting status of the
defendant under the FECA. In the majority opinion appear these
phrases:
[In an earlier case] we specifically affirmed the importance of preventing both the
actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of
public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.
These interests directly implicate "the integrity of our electoral process, and, not
less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of that
process. "44

If those words have any clear meaning, it is that the "integrity of

the electoral process" seems to have been swallowed up by or subsumed under the Court's favored interest: preventing corruption
and its appearance. In any event it is completely absent in the FEC
v. NCPAC opinion. Only Justice White's dissent honors it. Why it
fell into disfavor is but another of the mysteries in the recent jurisprudence on campaign finance.
Finally, there remains that cluster of interests the Court explicitly rejected in Buckley: the equalizing interests. To state such interests in terms of the positions of individuals in the political system
misstates the point. When government acts to limit individual
rights, it acts on behalf of collective interests. The purpose is not to
make groups or candidates equal; it is to uphold society's interest in
evenly-matched debate, in the full and broad recruitment of candidates, in responsible campaigning, and in the availability of viable
Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); and Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
41. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
42. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 58 (1976).
43. 459 u.s. 197 (1982).
44. Id. at 208 (quoting United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957)).
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alternatives for voters to choose between. It is those interests that
many legislators have thought were seriously compromised by the
uneven distribution of the major resource in campaigning. One
may think of these interests as an aspect of the broader interest in
preserving the integrity of elections. Or one may think of them as
an aspect of preserving democratic processes. It pretty much comes
down to the same thing.
V.

THE PROBLEMS OF PROOF

Let us return to the Court's single legitimate interest: prevention of real or apparent corruption. "Corruption" is obviously difficult to define. Equally troublesome is the problem of how to prove
its existence. The proof problem can be divided into two related
issues. How thoroughly will the Supreme Court review the evidence on which the Congress and state legislatures act? And second, with what kinds of evidence and by what standards of proof
will one be able to persuade the Court?4s
The first question is much easier to answer. We can be sure
that the Court will review legislative determinations very thoroughly. That is its customary stance when first amendment freedoms are at risk. Parties to a number of cases have urged the Court
to defer to legislative judgments about these quintessentially political questions. The language in several opinions indicates their
failure:
If appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative findings ... , these
arguments would merit our consideration.46
In addition, the record in this case does not support the California Supreme Court's
conclusion .... 47
If I found that the record before the California Supreme Court disclosed sufficient
evidence to justify . . .. 48

Even though the Justices-excepting Justice White49-have little
experience in the kinds of campaigns governed by the FECA, they
have shown no inclination in any case in the last decade to defer to
greater legislative expertise.
Thus, to the second issue: the kinds of evidence and proof. To
show corruption in the narrow sense, involving a quid pro quo, one
45. There has been little scholarly attention to these issues. A significant exception is
Thorsness, Independent Expenditures: Can Survey Research Establish a Link to Declining
Citizen Confidence in Government?, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 763 (1983).
46. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978).
47. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981).
48. /d. at 301 (Marshall, J., concurring).
49. Justice White coordinated the presidential campaign of John F. Kennedy in the
Mountain States in 1960.
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must offer evidence of specific behaviors and understandings. (The
question of mere "appearances" we will take up shortly.) Such evidence is very rare; one seldom hears even unsubstantiated allegations of this kind of corruption. If one thinks more broadly of
"improper" or "excessive" influence, one confronts new problems
of both definition and proof. Those problems were all too apparent
in the argument in FEC v. NCPAC.
Supporters of the restrictions on independent spending at issue
in that case confronted three imposing hurdles. They had to argue
the corrupting nature of a kind of expenditure that the Court earlier
had held could not, because of the absence of donor-candidate relationship, lead to corruption. Furthermore, the supporters of
9012(f) had to show, if not some exchange involving a quid pro
quo, at least some convincing kind of impropriety. Finally, they
had to involve the President of the United States rather than some
part of a large and diverse congressional contingent.
Small wonder, then, that the attempts to surmount these hurdles-in the record, briefs, and oral argument-were unconvincing.
There were stories of ambassadorships for wealthy contributors, of
contributors rubbing shoulders with cabinet members at "confidential" policy briefings, of cabinet appointments for such successful
fundraisers as James Edwards and Raymond Donovan. The trial
court in FEC v. NCPAC was scornful of this "evanescent" evidence,
noting especially that in the evidence on the political motivation of
appointments "there is nothing even remotely resembling corruption involved."so
Even without the constraints under which argument had to be
made in FEC v. NCPAC, however, no scholar or journalist has yet
established a causal relationship between campaign contributions
and governmental preference for private economic interests. The
financing of legislative campaigns offers the easiest case, and the
most common approach is typified by Common Cause's revelations
a few years ago that a large number of Congressmen who received
campaign contributions from the automobile and truck dealers'
PAC had voted to veto-legislative vetoes still being legal then-a
proposed rule of the Federal Trade Commission that would have
forced car dealers to put stickers on their used cars listing their various shortcomings. Indeed, it is not especially difficult to show that,
in some key and visible votes, members of the Congress support the
position of people who give them money. Who would expect it to
50. 578 F. Supp. 797, 830, 828 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The court, it should be noted, was
applying a narrow concept of corruption, one it undoubtedly believed was mandated by
Buckley.
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be otherwise? The analytical problem is one of determining cause
and effect; that is, do the votes follow the money, or does the money
follow the votes?si
Political scientists have another criticism of such studies, even
of those that by sequences of events make a strong case for concluding that, at least in some instances, the vote has followed the
money.s2 It is that they are "anecdotal"; the relationships are established or even merely alleged only in a very small number of
dramatic, titillating instances. Uncounted are the occasions in
which there is no dramatic relationship or in which contributors,
PACs for instance, lose in the congressional vote. Scholars have not
found it easy to cope with the problem of trying to establish relationships between money and votes in larger numbers of roll calls in
a congressional session. The most successful attempts have found
only a small positive relationship.53
Hopes, including judicial hopes, for a clearly established causal
nexus between campaign money and governmental preference simply cannot be fulfilled. In the absence of compelling proof, scholars
and journalists have great interpretive freedom. The result, for the
courts, will be a bewildering range of judgment. Already, in fact,
that range is present among the comments on Supreme Court decisions beginning with Buckley. Most of the harshest critics proceed
from the conviction that corruption, or at least gross impropriety, is
already rampant. P ACs rather than parties or individual contributors, they believe, are the chief corruptors. Their data and conclusions are drawn heavily from Elizabeth Drew's reportings4 and the
studies of such Washington groups as Common Cause and Ralph
Nader's Congress Watch.ss (Common Cause has organized a fundraising campaign against PACs, "People Against PACS," roundly
declaring that Congress is "UP FOR GRABS to the highest PAC
bidders.")
51. Sorauf, Political Action Committees in American Politics, in TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND, WHAT PRICE PACs? 27 (1984).
52. The reader should keep in mind that even when the vote follows the money there is
not necessarily a case of bribery. There must be additional evidence of an explicit prior
arrangement.
53. See, e.g., ]. KAU & P. RUBIN, CONGRESSMEN, CONSTITUENTS, AND CONTRIBUTORS: DETERMINANTS OF ROLL CALL VOTING IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(1982). The classic analysis of the determinants of congressional voting in the political science literature is J. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (2d ed. 1981).
54. E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY (1983).
55. See, e.g., Nicholson, Political Campaign Expenditure Limitations and the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 601 (1983); Wright, Money and the
Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 609 (1982).
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The conclusions of political scientists are more restrained.s6
They frame the money-influence nexus as a part of the broader
problem of explaining legislative behavior. Any number of influences or pressures may shape a legislator's vote on an issue: the
voting constituency (the "folks back home"), the party leadership
and caucus in the legislature, the party outside of the legislature, the
President or governor, expert research and opinion, public opinion
generally, individual or group lobbying, the personal values and
outlooks of the legislator, and the contributors to the campaign
treasury. Just where and with what effect that last source of influence enters the calculus of legislative decision is hard to pinpoint
with much accuracy, but many scholars would agree with Larry J.
Sabato: "PAC contributions do make a difference, at least on some
occasions, in securing access and influencing the course of events on
the House and Senate floors. But those occasions are not nearly as
frequent as anti-PAC spokesmen, even congressmen themselves,
often suggest."57 The occasions of substantial PAC influence,
Sabato adds, tend to be those issues that are relatively invisible, narrow, and specialized-in short, those issues of which the other
sources of influence are unaware or about which they are unconcerned. And so it is with campaign contributions more generally.
There is "some" influence, but perhaps not "undue" or "excessive"
influence, let alone "corruption."
If the empirical case on actual influence is uncertain, the one
on "appearances," while more substantial, also raises problems. In
the first place, whose perceptions does the Supreme Court have in
mind? Most commentators assume that the Court is talking about
general public opinion.ss By making that assumption one also
transforms the question into one of confidence in democratic institutions-no less, that is, than the issue of the mass support necessary for the legitimacy of democratic institutions.
Informal, anecdotal evidence abounds that large numbers of
Americans see a corrupting link between campaign contributions
and the policies of government. Anyone who has spoken at any
public forum on American campaign finance can report the fears
56. See, e.g., Malbin, Looking Back at the Future of Campaign Finance Reform, in
MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 232 (M. Malbin ed. 1984); L. SABATO, PAC
POWER (1984).
57. L. SABATO, supra note 56, at 135.
58. There is, however, a troubling indication that at least one federal judge has the
judiciary in mind. Consider this sentence: "Even large expenditures made by political committees not attached to any business or union create little appearance of corruption since
there is little the president can do to benefit such committees financially." FEC v. NCPAC,
578 F. Supp. 797, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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that emerge in the question or discussion period.s9 Many members
of Congress report the same fears; Representative Matthew F. McHugh (Dem.-N.Y.) is typical:
I don't have to tell you about the skepticism, if not cynicism, that prevails in our
body politic. The average citizen sees increasing amounts of money going to political campaigns because of a special interest and concludes, in many cases, at least,
that this is corrupting the process. It may not be true, but the perception is certainly there and that is as important as the reality itself. If we ignore that, we ignore
what's happening in the minds of people in our political system.60

For a more systematic analysis of public opinion, one must rely
on polls. The courts had substantial poll data before them in deciding FEC v. NCPAC. There was first of all a Louis Harris poll from
mid-1983. It asked respondents to indicate how much they would
trust (e.g., "a great deal" to "not at all") a specific kind of PAC if
that PAC were to "support and give money to" a presidential candidate in 1984. Substantial majorities responded that they would
have little or no trust in NCPAC, labor PACs, or business and corporate PACs. Then from a specially-commissioned poll conducted
by the Roper organization, the plaintiffs introduced five questions
asked of a national sample of adults. The questions included ones
about possible contributors to presidential campaigns, reasons for
wanting limits on contributions (of the eighty-five percent who favored limits, sixty percent said the reason was "too much influence"), and support for public funding of presidential campaigns.
The final question is worth quoting in full:
Since 1971 [sic] nearly every presidential candidate has chosen to receive Federal
funds rather than raise his money from outside sources. But in recent elections
some private interest groups have spent very large sums of money on television
advertising to support a particular candidate. Some people say this is quite all right
and very different from giving the same amount of money directly to the candidate.
Others says it is a purely technical way of getting around the 1971 law and should
be stopped. Do you think it is all right or should be stopped?

While twenty-five percent of the respondents thought it "all right,"
sixty-five percent thought it "should be stopped."6I
To no avail. The trial court in FEC v. NCPAC dismissed it all
as irrelevant. Said the court: "Only distrust in the integrity of government engendered by the conduct proscribed by section 9012(f)'s
prohibitions can save the statute. "62 Even the fifth and last question
59. For something of the experience the reader can examine the transcript of one such
session in 10 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 466 (1983).
60. H. ALEXANDER & B. HAGGERTY, PACs AND PARTIES 59 (1984).
61. These two surveys are fully summarized in the trial court's opinion in FEC v.
NCPAC. They are reported in full as a joint stipulation of fact in the Joint Appendix submitted by the parties before the Supreme Court.
62. FEC v. NCPAC, 578 F. Supp. 797, 825 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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of the Roper poll (quoted above) failed to move the court. Its results, the court thought, were "suggestive" but "fatally incomplete.
The poll does not follow up on the question and ask why those so
responding believe independent expenditures should be stopped. "63
As an afterthought the court also suggested in a footnote that the
question at issue was "leading and argumentative" and that polls
generally raise "complicated hearsay problems." Only because the
poll data did not survive under other provisions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence did the court not test them against the hearsay
rule.64 The Justices simply agreed with the trial court that "the
evidence falls far short of being adequate for this purpose. "6s
By the standards of the two courts in FEC v. NCPAC one can
safely say that poll data will never "prove" the appearance of corruption. The fundamental mistake of the judges was to assume that
the mass public has an "opinion" on specific sections of specific statutes. Since many newspaper reporters and headline writers do not
grasp the distinction between campaign contributions and independent expenditures, it seems safe to conclude that neither do
most American adults. Public opinion will be about larger issuesabout "big money" in a generalized system of campaign finance. It
will not be about 9012(f). The appearance of corruption for the
public will involve a somewhat disorderly set of perceptions and
attitudes about political institutions generally; about P ACs, corporations, and labor unions themselves; about the sums of money
spent in campaigns; and even about the substance and events of the
campaigns.
Most students of American opinion and politics would, I suspect, find the survey data in FEC v. NCPAC far more convincing
than the courts did, especially in the context of a broader loss of
confidence in American institutions. For example, the University of
Michigan's Institute for Social Research has for some years been
asking national adult samples: "Would you say the government is
pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or
that it is run for the benefit of all people?" In 1964 only twentynine percent chose the "few big interests" option; in 1982 some
sixty-one percent did.66 No one suggests that such a loss of confidence in politicians and legislatures is the result only, or even
chiefly, of campaign money. Indeed, even the direction of the relationship is unclear; perhaps loss of confidence in politics and gov63. /d. at 827.
64. /d. at 827 n.42.
65. FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1470.
66. Miller, Is Confidence Rebounding? Pus. OPINION, June-July 1983, at 17. On confidence more generally, see also S. LIPSET & W. ScHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP (1983).
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ernment makes people suspect the worst in campaign finance. But
it seems clear that we have here a set of related data that are "of a
piece" and that point to campaign finance as one element in a growing cynicism about American political institutions.
In sum, we have a divergence here between reality and the appearance of reality. But appearances and perceptions are a potent
reality in themselves. Many people see only the fiickerings on the
wall of the cave. Their understandings about the impact of cash
contributions to candidates or independent spending in a campaign
will contribute to their evaluation of the American political system
and thus to their conclusions about whether to trust it, obey it, and
work within it.
Unhappily, in its confusion about the nature of mass beliefs
and their measurement, the Supreme Court has added another serious misunderstanding to its initial failure to grasp the important
issues in the relationship between contributor and policymaker. Indeed, in its standards of proof both for corruption and for the appearance of corruption the Court has made it virtually impossible to
prove the conditions under which it will permit additional regulations of American campaign finance. The Justices seem to be looking for immediate, irrefutable causal evidence, but it is unlikely that
anyone can find it for them.
VI.

THE OUTER LIMITS OF ADVOCACY

To test the validity of statutory restrictions on the first amendment rights of campaign spenders the Supreme Court has framed a
vague and irrelevant question that admits of no easy, or perhaps
even satisfactory, answers. Advocates and legislatures are seriously
constrained. They are especially constrained in trying to get outside
of the Court's doctrines, whether by urging it to soften its position
or by calling its attention to the changing realities of American
campaign finance.
Consider the problem of the plaintiffs in FEC v. NCPAC-the
Federal Election Commission, the Democratic party, and the Democratic National Committee-and their chief friend, Common
Cause. Should they have urged the Court to reconsider Buckley?
On the one hand, there was the signal of the four-to-four vote in
Common Cause v. Schmitt. Yet there was also the need to salvage a
specific and limited statutory clause, even in the face of the Court's
having struck down a limit on other independent spending in Buckley. The advocates' choice is clear from the record and transcript of
oral argument: they chose not to attack Buckley, despite the tantalizing tie vote in Schmitt. Only Common Cause tried to move the
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Court beyond Buckley. While not attacking the precedent directly,
its brief argued that the lower court had given an excessively literal
meaning to the concept of corruption. 67 (The Supreme Court, of
course, did not agree.) Common Cause also tried to convince the
Court that it might depart somewhat from Buckley without abandoning it:
[T]he Buckley court was concerned primarily with the independent efforts of indi·
viduals and informal groups, rather than the full scale, professional shadow campaigns waged by appellees and similar political committees. . . . [T]he Court
recognized that new patterns of conduct and new evidence of threats to the electoral
process posed by purportedly independent spending might well cause the First
Amendment balance to be struck differently.68

The argument, once more, was to no avail.
The nub of the problem is this: to go beyond the logic of Buckley one must escape the Court's definition of the one legislative interest, and then one must escape the Court's conviction that there is
only one policy issue, and thus one interest, that justifies the regulation of campaign money. The first of those "escapes" I have discussed already; the second of them, the more drastic one, needs
elaboration here.
For most observers there are two overriding policy issues in
today's campaign finance: the impact that spenders have on the
eventual making of public policy, and the impact of money on the
campaign itself and the result of the election. The Court's recognition of a governmental interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption addresses, however unsatisfactorily, the
former of these issues. But it leaves the electoral problem untouched. Moreover, it is the electoral issues that are increasingly
salient, and nowhere is that clearer than in the case of independent
expenditures. The Supreme Court is largely correct that these expenditures do not raise serious questions of direct influence on political decisionmaking.69 But they do raise troubling questions about
the integrity of American elections. In the 1984 campaigns, for
example:
-One citizen, Michael Goland of Los Angeles, spent (independently) more than
$1,100,000 to defeat Senator Charles Percy of Illinois in his primary and general
election campaigns for reelection. Goland's motives have never been made clear,
but speculation centers on the possibility that he may have thought Percy insuffi67.
(1985).
68.
69.

Brief of Common Cause as Amicus Curiae at 31, FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. 1459

/d. at 41.
When NCPAC threatens members of Congress with campaigns to urge their defeat
if they stray from its legislative preferences-as it has done sometimes-it does indeed raise
an issue of policy making.
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ciently supportive of Israel. No other individual has ever intervened to that extent in a campaign for the Congress.
-In the Senate race in Texas, won by Republican Phil Gramm, a total of $731,643
was spent independently by eighteen different groups and individuals. These
totals, too, are without precedent.
-Overall, independent expenditures in federal elections in 1984 totalled
$23,400,000, with $17,500,000 in the presidential race and $6,000,000 in campaigns for the House and Senate. The comparable figures for 1980 were
$14,200,000, with the two components at $12,000,000 and $2,200,000.

Behind those facts are a number of important issues. The major one
is responsibility. If a candidate's own campaign offends any voters,
they can respond by voting for that candidate's opponent. If an
independent campaign offends them, they have no recourse. Nor is
there recourse for a candidate who finds that an independent campaign intended to help his campaign is in fact hurting it.
Recent trends in all aspects of campaign finance-including
those of independent expenditures-suggest another issue in the integrity of elections: competition. For example, the amounts of
money available to incumbents, and available early in the election
cycle, are one reason they win reelection in such large numbers. In
the 1984 congressional campaigns those general election candidates
who were incumbents spent $187,000,000; their challengers spent
only $93,100,000. (Political action committees, incidentally, gave
seventy percent of their contributions in 1983-84 to incumbent
members of the House and Senate running for reelection.)
Competitiveness is a concept that applies to parties as well as
to individual candidates. In recent years Republican Party committees active in national campaigns have been raising from three to
five times as much money as comparable Democratic committees.
The Republican Party raised $300,200,000 in 1983-84, the Democrats $96,700,000. In addition, independent expenditures heavily
favor Republican candidates; of the $17,500,000 spent in the 1984
presidential campaign for example, ninety-one percent was in support of the Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan. Democratic
candidates for Congress do maintain parity with the Republicans by
reason of their advantage in incumbency, but Democratic candidates for open seats in the House in 1984 spent an average of
$359,843, Republicans an average of $401,196.
The funding inequalities may well have reduced electoral competition in the states and congressional districts. Any reduction of
competition surely affects the health of our democracy, for without
campaigns and elections that present well-defined and viable alternatives, the right to vote loses its central importance. Indeed, the
major scholar working in the field, Gary Jacobson, concludes that
while levels of campaign funding tend not to be related to the sue-
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cesses or failures of incumbents, they do affect the chances of challengers running against them-the larger the campaign treasury,
the greater the share of the two-party vote in the election.7o Challengers obviously depend on ample campaign resources to overcome
the advantages of incumbency.
Once again, public perceptions are important. Many Americans undoubtedly think that money can "buy" victory at the polls,
even though scholars may find the subject more complex than that.
The independent expenditures of the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) in 1983-84 afford an especially
apt illustration of the image-reality gap. NCPAC reported expenditures of $19,500,000 for the 1983-84 election period, a figure that
was widely reported in the media with no explanation and with the
implicit suggestion that all of the massive sum went directly into the
campaign. In fact, NCPAC reported independent expenditures of
$10,200,000 and contributions of $130,000, a total of $10,330,000 in
political expenditures. But the careful probings of Michael Malbin
discovered that eighty-five percent of the reported independent expenditures actually went for direct mail and fund raising expenses;
so the remaining fifteen percent of the $10,200,000 in independent
spending comes only to $1,530,000. That figure, when added to the
total of direct contributions, yields a "real" political spending figure
of$1,660,000. No doubt the $19,500,000 total appeared in far more
newspapers than the $1,660,000 tota1.7t
Here again the question is whether appearances are more important than reality. The media focus on "big money," on large
political organizations (i.e., PACs), and on mounting levels of campaign spending. Even well-informed citizens have no way of knowing that PAC contributions still account for less than thirty percent
of the receipts of congressional candidates and that individual contributors still account for well over half. Nor do they know what a
gross expenditure total, such as NCPAC's $19,500,000, really
means. And nothing in their reading or experience gives them a
sense of the complexity of congressional decisionmaking.
On the Supreme Court, only Justice White has shown some
inclination to take the problem of appearances seriously. In his dissent in the Berkeley referendum case he ventured closer to the issue
than has any of his colleagues:
Perhaps, as I have said, neither the City of Berkeley nor the State of California
70. G. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980).
71. I am not aware of any newspaper that reported the latter figure. Malbin's research
and the facts reported here are all contained in Brownstein, On Paper, Conservative PACs
Were Tigers in 1984-But Look Again, 17 NAT'L J. 1504 (1985).
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can "prove" that elections have been or can be unfairly won by special interest
groups spending large sums of money, but there is a widespread conviction in legislative halls, as well as among citizens, that the danger is real. I regret that the
Court continues to disregard that hazard.72

VII.

CONCLUSION

Problems begin at the beginning, and so it was with Buckley.
The Court found itself rushed to a premature adjudication of the
many parts of the FECA before even one election had been held
under its provisions. As Laurence Tribe has written: "One consequence of this expedited review was that the Supreme Court, working in a factual vacuum, was forced to indulge in more than a little
empirical speculation about such issues as the circumvention of expenditure limits and the impact of those limits on campaign
speech."73 In view of the immaturity of the issues in 1976, not to
mention the paucity of data available to the Justices, one would
have expected the Court to proceed with tentativeness and narrowness of purpose. Circumspection was all the more strongly dictated
by the fact that the statute at hand aimed to alter fundamentally the
activities it regulated.
And so the Justices marched into the thicket of American electoral politics. They had been there before, but never recently in the
most tangled patch of it all: the exceptionally complex system of
American campaign finance. Its practices are arcane, its regulations convoluted, its mysteries unknown even to many candidates
themselves. The Justices, with one exception, had little experience
in all of this, and in an important way they never really developed a
feel for it. Despite all the arguments and stipulations in FEC v.
NCPAC, for example, they never grasped the idea of a flow of
money, which if stopped at one outlet would build up pressure at
others. In their obsession with corruption of officials and their unconcern for the well-being of the electoral process, moreover, they
framed a jurisprudence that was strangely, even quaintly, at odds
with contemporary political realities.
Worse, perhaps, the Court never developed ways of relating its
doctrine to realistic burdens of proof. It set-and allowed trial
courts to set-standards of empirical proof for the governmental
interests behind legislation that were beyond reason and beyond the
standards of informed scholarship. In addition, by looking always
for a direct, one-to-one, independent-to-dependent variable, causal
72. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 311 (1981) (White,
J., dissenting).
73. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 800 n.l (1978).
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relationship, it betrayed some lack of sophistication about the enormous complexity of social causation. To draw standards of proof
for such relationships from the Federal Rules of Evidence is simply
to misunderstand completely the causal problem at hand.
On one matter in these cases, however, the Court was on much
firmer ground: the importance of "appearances." Public confidence in a political system is both as important and as fragile as it is
in an economy or a banking system. If the appearance of corruption-or of excessive influence--reduces confidence in political institutions, it ultimately sacrifices a necessary condition for a
politically active and law-abiding citizenry and, thus, a necessary
condition for the health of the institutions themselves.
Acceptable legal proof of those appearances will be hard to
find, however, if FEC v. NCPAC is any measure. So the gap between reality and the image of reality seems destined to endure. But
not without a striking irony. Popular perceptions will continue to
be shaped by the extensive media coverage of campaign finance.
This sensational reporting results largely from the disclosure provisions of the FECA; to collect data about big financial transactions
of any kind and then to make them easily available is inevitably to
excite the attention of the media and thus to crank up its great
imagemaking machines.
In retrospect one wonders whether that four-to-four vote in
Common Cause v. Schmitt reflected twinges of doubt about the certainties of Buckley. Were some of the Justices, no strangers to the
mass media, beginning to develop concerns about appearances?
Whether it was a signal or not, it produced no assault on Buckley,
and it is not easy to imagine what circumstances might lead to such
an assault. Meanwhile, Congress is left with the mangled torso of
its major legislation on campaign finance and with the frustration
that always accompanies a paucity of options. Most important, the
gap between the reality of campaign finance and the mass perception of that reality remains. So, too, does the gap between that perception-with its fears, its sense of inequity, and its growing
cynicism-and the Supreme Court's celebration of the new constitutional rights that prevent Congress from addressing the problem.
To emphasize appearances is, of course, to concede a major
role to illusion and emotion. All political reform movements, however, are fueled by simplistic explanations of reality; one would be
hard put to think of a reform movement in American history without a devil theory. The creation of "devils" is a useful mode of
social explanation for many adults, and exorcism of these devils is
an important way of reestablishing the credibility and legitimacy of
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political institutions. The Supreme Court has failed to recognize
that important fact about mass democratic opinion and consent in
the past when it has stymied reform movements. That failure, in
turn, is one very persuasive reason for deference to legislative assessments of political beliefs and appearances.

